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CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND CONGRESSIONAL
VOTING: A SIMULTANEOUS PROBIT-TOBIT MODEL
Henry W. Chappell, Jr.*

M

I.

Introduction

/[ ANY citizens and scholars have been

ble), the single equation estimation technique
employed by Durden and Silbermanis subject to
a possible simultaneousequations bias. For each
issue studied,I have thereforejointlyestimateda
two equation systemexplainingboth votes on the
bill and contributionsfroman associated interest
group. The "'simultaneous probit-Tobit"model
which I use takes into account the dichotomous
natureof the variable indicatinga congressman's
vote, the non-negativityconstraintimposed on
the contributionvariable, and the possibilityof
correlationbetween the errortermsforthe equations explainingthese two variables.2 Full-information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimates
forthe model are consistentand asymptotically
efficient.

troubled by the influence that special
interestgroups appear to exert over policymaking as a result of theirroles in the financingof
politicalcampaigns. These concerns inspiredthe
enactmentof a numberof electionlaw reformsin
the 1970s, and have led to increasing popular
support for public financingof electoral campaigns. Despite the public attentionthese issues
have attracted, few social scientists have attemptedto analyze the financialrelationshipsbetween interestgroups and policymakersempirically.1 One such studywas reportedby Durden
and Silberman (1976), who included contributions fromthe AFL-CIO politicalaction commitII. The Model
tee as an independent variable in an equation
minimum
on
explaining congressional voting
In the analysis of votingon a particularissue,
wage legislation. Their results indicated that
principal economic agents of concern are
the
affectedvotcampaigncontributionssignificantly
and a single interestgroup.3 Concongressmen
ing on that issue. The work I have done differs
votingdecisions are presumedto be
gressmen's
substantiallyfromthatof Durden and Silberman
motivatedby a desire to be reelected, while the
in two ways. First, I have chosen to examine
interestgroup is assumed to allocate campaign
issues whichwere of considerablynarrowerconto various candidates in an attempt to
funds
cernthanthe minimumwage issue. In the interest
influencethe legislativeoutcome of the issue. In
of simplicity,I examine issues of concern to just
(1)-(5) below, I hypothesize a "simultaneous
one or a few groups. I have also used a different
model (hence referredto as model
probit-Tobit"
econometric technique. If campaign contribuSPT) to explain voting decisions made by contions are actually endogenous (as seems plausigressmenand contributiondecisions made by the
interestgroup:

Received forpublicationDecember 29, 1980. Revision accepted for publicationMay 27, 1981.
(1)
1i (
Yli = Yw2i + /31X1V* Universityof South Carolina.
This paper is based on myPh.D. dissertationin economics.
(2)
- (T2V2i
Y2 =82X2i
I wish to acknowledge the valuable suggestionsof my ad>
visors, Susan Rose-Ackerman and Ray C. Fair. Comments
(3)
i if Yzi 0
wi=
froman anonymousrefereehave improvedthe expositionof
several points.
I A numberof previouseconometricworks have dealt with
(4)
Y2i if Y2i >0
W2i=
various aspects of campaign financeor roll-callvoting. See,
OifY2i-< 0
for example, Jackson (1974), Welch (1974, 1980). Palda
(1975), Durden and Silberman (1976), Jacobson (1978),
Abrams (1977), Danielson and Rubin (1977), and Kau and
2 The model I use belongs to the general class of models
Rubin (1979). Only the article by Durden and Silberman
examines the connection between fundingand subsequent described by Heckman (1976, 1978); however, the specific
voting.In recentworks, Kau, Keenan, and Rubin (1979) and model I use has not been previouslyestimated.Some related
Welch (forthcoming)have independentlyundertakenstudies models are discussed in Chappell (1981).
3 A more detailed formalpresentationof the theoryis proof contributionsand voting,but they have employed econometricapproaches which differfromthe simultaneousequa- vided in Chappell (1979), which is based in parton the work
of Rose-Ackerman (1978).
tions model developed here.
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E(vji) = 0; E(vji2) = 1; E(VliV2i)
E(vjivj,i,)= O;forj,j'
j
i,i'= 1,...,n;i

=P;

=

1, 2;

(5)

where
Yli = a latent variable indicatingthe propensity of a congressman to vote in
favor of the interestgroup position;
w1i= a dummyvariable equal to 1 to indicate a "yes" vote (i.e., in favorof the
interestgroup's favored alternative),
and equal to 0 for a "no" vote;
Y2i = a latent variable indicatingthe propensityoftheinterestgroupto contribute to congressman i;
=
fromthe interW2i the actual contribution
i;
to
congressman
est group
conindicating
variables
of
a
vector
is
X1j
stituencycharacteristicsand the fixed
attributesof congressman i;
X2,is a vector of variables indicatingthe
legislative power of congressmani if
he is elected, his probabilityof election, and his initialpositionon the issue;
13i,/32 are vectors of coefficients;
o2, y are scalar coefficients;
v1, v2are random errorterms.
It is assumed that v1j and v2j have a bivariate
p,
withcorrelationcoefficient
normaldistribution
to
and that restrictionssufficient identifyequation (1) are imposed.
The probit equation, (1), is hypothesized to
explain votes on the issue.4 According to the
model, a "yes" vote occurs when the unobserved latent variable y1i exceeds a threshold
level of zero, and a "no" vote occurs otherwise.
This unobserved variable can be interpretedas
the candidate's "propensity to vote in favor of
the interestgroup."
Equation (1) indicates that the propensityto
favorthe interestgroupis a functionof contributions from the interestgroup and a vector of
exogenous variables. It is useful to imaginethat
the exogenous variables determine an "initial
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position" on the issue fora candidate, and that
contributionscause shiftsaway fromthat position. The theoreticalmotivationforthisformulaTo increase his chances
tion is straightforward.
of election,a candidate will attemptto reflectthe
interestsof constituentsin his policy positions;
thus constituentcharacteristicsare included in
the vector X~1.In a political world characterized
by imperfectknowledge, he need not reflect
those preferencesperfectlyto avoid certainelectoral loss, however. Personal ideological preferences and partyplanks (also included in X1j) will
affecthis votingas well. Imperfectvoterknowledge also allows campaign spending to aid in
securingvotes, so a congressmanmightbe willing to alter his advocated policy somewhat if a
campaign contributionwere offered as an inducement. Voting could also be affected by
contributionsin more subtle ways. Alexander
(1972), for example, has argued that contributions mightinduce a sympatheticresponse in a
congressmanwhichmay not even be apparentto
the recipienthimself,and Welch (forthcoming)
relationship
has likened the contribution-voting
to the reciprocal givingof Christmasgifts.The
formulationof equation (1) is consistent with
candidate responses to contributionswhich reflecttradeoffsto increase chances of election, as
well as those whichreflectinduced sympathyfor
one's supporters.
Interestgroup contributionsare explained by
the Tobit equation, (2).5 Positive contributions
are observed when an unobserved "propensity
to contributeto a candidate," Y2i, exceeds 0.
When the propensityto contributeis positive,
actual contributionsequal the propensityto contribute; when the propensity to contribute is
negative, a zero contributionis observed.
An importantassumption about the interest
group6underliesthe specificationof the equation

5 The simple linear model would also be inappropriatefor
an equation to explain contributions.Observed contributions
are always greaterthanor equal to zero, but predictedvalues
of contributionsobtained fromordinaryleast squares (OLS)
estimates can be negative. Since more than half of the observedcontributionsequal zero foreach ofthe issues studied,
constrainton predicted
failureto impose the non-negativity
4 Problems encountered in using the linear probability contributionscould imply a serious misspecificationof the
model when the dependentvariable is dichotomousare well model. See Tobin (1958) fora discussion of the single equaknown: predicted values of the dependent variable are not tion Tobit model.
limitedto the 0 to I interval,and the errorsare heteroscedas6 By assumingjust one interestgroup, I rule out complicatic and non-normal.Johnson(1972) has discussed the single tions which would arise if several groups were competingto
equation probitmodel.
achieve differentoutcomes.
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to explain contributions.I assume that in attemptingto secure favorable policy by making
contributions,the interestgroup regards candidates' probabilitiesof election as fixed. Both intuitionand some empiricalevidence suggestthat
this assumptionis a good approximationof reality. Althoughaggregate candidate expenditures
may have some effecton election chances, a
contributionfromany particulargroupwill probably have negligible impact.7 Given that the
group regardselection probabilitiesas fixed,its
motive for contributingmust be to alter candidate policies via their reactions as specified in
equation (1).8 (Welch (1974) has referredto this
aim as the "quid pro quo" motive.) Contributions should thereforebe targeted at powerful
congressmen (e.g., veteran members of important committees)and at likelywinners (e.g., incumbents). Influencinga candidate will be of little benefitifhe has poor chances of gaininga seat
in the legislature,or if he has no political clout
once elected. The natureof majorityvotingprocesses also encourages contributorsto try to
build winningsized coalitions. Since coalitions
are moreeasily builtarounda nucleus of supporters, we expect to see more contributionsgiven
to those with some initialtendencyto favorthe
interestgroup ratherthan to those stronglyinclinedto oppose them.Thus contributionswillbe
a functionof X2i,a vectorof variables indicating
the legislative power of candidate i conditional
upon his election,his probabilityof election, and
his initialpositionon the issue of concern. In the
followingempiricalanalysis, the variables in X1i
are employed as indicatorsof a congressman's
initialposition, thus X1,iis a subset of X2i.
Model SPT differsfrom standard probit and
a non-zerocorTobit models only by permitting
relation coefficientfor the error terms of the
equations. So long as p = 0, singleequation techniques could be used to estimateboth equations
(1) and (2) consistently.If p $ 0, however, the
7 The econometric results of Jacobson (1978) show that
even aggregateexpendituresby incumbents(who make up a
largeproportionofthe sample I use) have littleor no effecton
the percentageof votes won.
8 Based on an econometricinvestigation,
Welch (1980, p.
115) concluded that"an interestgroupcontributesin orderto
obtain political favors, not to affectelectoral outcomes."
This is not inconsistentwiththe earlier assertion that politicians may desire contributionsto furthertheirelection aims,
since politiciansmay be consideringthe aggregateeffectsof
all of theircontributions.
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error term v1iwill generallybe correlated with
the endogenous explanatoryvariable w2iin equation (1). When an explanatoryvariable is correlated with the error term, the single equation
probitestimatoris subject to a bias similarto that
arisingin OLS estimationof a linearmodel under
similar circumstances (see Olsen, 1975). This
bias could resultin very misleadingconclusions.
For example, suppose we analyze votingon appropriationsforthe B-I bomber,but no measure
of "hawkishness" is included as an exogenous
variable in eitherequation (1) or (2). If Rockwell
International(the prime contractorfor the aircraft) contributedonly to "hawks," hoping to
ensure their election, and if these hawks later
voted in favor of the B-1 bomber because they
vote in favor of all militaryspending, then a
correlation between contributions and votes
would result. The relationship would not be
causal, however,and reportedsignificanceof the
contributioncoefficientwould be attributableto
the correlationof errortermsresultingfromthe
omission of a variable. Use of a simultaneous
equations estimatoris thereforeappropriate.
FIML estimatescan be obtainedforall parameters of model SPT, including the correlation
coefficientp. These estimatesare consistentand
asymptoticallyefficient,and thereforeavoid the
problemsinherentwiththe singleequation probit
estimators.A briefdiscussion of computational
matters is presented in an appendix which is
available fromthe author upon request.
The proposed model is necessarilya simplification of the real politico-economic world, and
briefmentionshould be made of several importantreal world complications.We have assumed
that congressmen's votes are independent of
each other,yetin the real worldinterdependence
may resultfromlogrollingor fromthe emulation
of leaders. The model also supposes thatinterest
groups are rewarded for contributing,but it
makes no provisionforpunishmentof those who
contributeto a congressman's enemies. In addition,candidates and interestgroups may interact
throughchannels which the model does not consider: an interestgroup may contributeby offering an illegal bribe or an in-kindcontributionof
labor; congressmencan respond via committee
activities.Contributormotivesmay also be more
complex. Contributionsmightbe used to establish a reward structurewhich serves as a means
of communication about the kind of behavior

80
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expected of recipients,or interestgroups might
give to friendlycandidates in hopes that their
campaigningwill sway voter opinion in favorof
the group. Perhaps more importantly,
the model
has assumed that the contributiondecision is a
unilateralone, made by the contributoralone. I
have not accounted for endogenous candidate
solicitation efforts,or for the possibility that
candidates can turndown offeredcontributions.
Despite these deficiencies,the model does provide a reasonable frameworkforanalyzingvoting
decisions, and similar models have had some
success in explainingcongressional voting. Development of models incorporatingmore real
world features provides a task for future research.
III.

The EmpiricalStudy

The precedingtheoreticaldiscussion provides
a basis forthe empiricalanalysisof interestgroup
campaign contributionsand roll call voting by
membersof the U.S. House of Representatives
in the 1974-1977 period. Several criteria were
used to guide the selection of the seven issues
analyzed in the study. First,an effortwas made
to avoid issues of concern to numerous diverse
and competinginterestgroups. Ideally, just one
group should be associated with each issue. Issues in regulatorypolicy often conformto this
criterionreasonably well, since a regulated industryusually provides a unifiedinterest,and
their opponents are diffuseand unorganized. I
have also attemptedto select issues for which
close votes were recorded in the House, since
in theirdecongressmenmay behave differently
cision-makingwhen voting on issues of certain
versus those of doubtfuloutcomes. Issues for
whicha congressmanmustseriouslyconsiderthe
possibilitythat his vote could influencethe ultimate outcome of legislation are preferred.Finally, it was also necessary to choose issues for
which an associated interestgroup made substantialcontributions.
The seven issues chosen for study include
mortgage disclosure requirementsfor lenders,
milk price supports,truckweightlimits,tax rebates for oil companies, fundingfor the B-1
bomber,auto emissions controls,and a maritime
cargo preferencebill. The firstthreeissues were
voted on in 1975 and have been analyzed in conjunction with contributiondata from the 1974
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election, while the remainingfour issues were
voted on in 1977 and have been used with contributiondata from the 1976 election. Table 1
brieflydescribes the legislative content of the
seven issues, lists associated campaign contributorsand their preferredpolicies, and indicates what variables are employed in the empirical studyto representconstituentpreferenceson
the bill. It also reportssome summarystatistics,
includingthe numberof congressmenin the sample receivingcontributionsfromeach group,and
the aggregatevalue of those contributions.The
numberof congressmenforand againstthe interest group's favoredalternativeare also listed, as
is the simple correlation coefficientbetween
group contributionsto individual congressmen
and the dummy variable indicating a congressman's vote. In all cases the vote variable is
definedso that votes favoringthe interestgroup
are assigned a value of one, thuspositivecorrelations were anticipated.The table shows that for
all eight contributors,contributionsand associated votes were positivelycorrelated.
The selection of explanatory variables to be
included in the empiricalanalysis was guided by
the discussion in section II. For an equation explainingvotes on a given issue, the explanatory
variables included contributionsfromthe associated interestgroup, a dummyvariable to indicate party affiliation,and an ideological rating,
ACA. ACA is a conservativeratingcomputedby
the Americans for ConstitutionalAction, and
was included not only as an indicatorof a congressman's personal ideological bent,but also as
a measure of constituency preferences (since
conservative constituentsdo tend to elect conservative representatives). In addition, other
variables appropriateto specificissues were included, when available, as indicatorsof constituent preferences(see table 1).9 For equations explaining contributions from interest groups,
explanatoryvariables included dummyvariables
for relevant committee memberships (as indi9 A detailed list of variable definitionsis available fromthe
authorupon request. Sources of data includeThe Almanac of
American Politics, Common Cause's 1974 Congressional
Campaign Finances and 1976 Federal Campaign Finances,
The Congressional DistrictData Book, Congressional Quarterlv Almanac, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Review,
1976 House of Representativbes
Receipts and Expenditures
(Federal Elections Commission), Vessel Entrances and
Clearances (Bureau of the Census), and theBasic Petroleum
Data Book (American PetroleumInstitute).
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Effectof Proposal
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InterestGroup
Contributions

Interest
Group
Position

VoteContribution
Correlation
Coefficient

Indicators of Constituent
Preferences

1. Red-liningDisclosure
Amendment
House Vote 487, 1975
Sample Size: 328
Favoring Group: 164
Opposing Group: 164

Would ease proposed
requirementsfordetailed
reportingof the geographic
distributionof mortgageloans.

AmericanBankingAssociation:
$40,550 to 48 Congressmen

Favored

.0748

Urban population percentage

2. Milk Price Supports
House Vote 45, 1975
Sample Size: 417
FavoringGroup: 196
Opposing Group: 221

Would reduce the proposed
milk price supportlevel from
851'Xto 804c of parity.

Associated Milk Producers,
Dairymen Incorporated:
9124,585 to 58 Congressmen

Opposed

.1873

Dummy variable indicating
dairyfarmingimportancein
a district:
Rural farmpopulation
percentage

3. Truck Weight Limits
House Vote 600, 1975
Sample Size: 412
FavoringGroups: 276
Opposing Groups: 136

Would roll back maximum
truck weightsallowed on
interstatehighwaysfrom80,000
lb. to 73.289 lb.

American Trucking
Association: $79,500to 131
Congressmen:
Teamsters: $79,834 to 90
Congressmen

Opposed

.1604

Opposed

.0255

4. Cargo PreferenceBill
House Vote 618, 1977
Sample Size: 420
Favoring Group: 164
Opposing Group: 256

Would require 9.5(' of America's oil importsto be shipped
in U.S. built and operated
ships.

Maritime Unions: 5358,004 to
164 Congressmen

Favored

.3737

Per capita tons enteringports
in a congressman's state

5. Crude Oil Tax Rebate
House Vote 474, 1977
Favoring Group: 197
Opposing Group: 222

Would returnpart of the
revenues fromthe proposed
crude oil equalization tax to
producerswho make additional
investmentsin oil exploration.

Major Oil Companies: 5159,232
to 190 Congressmen

Favored

.4393

Per capita oil productionin
a congressman'sstate

6. Auto Emissions Standards
House Vote 266, 1977
Sample Size: 389
FavoringGroup: 202
Opposing Group: 187

Would impose stricter
emissions standardsfor
automobiles.

National Automobile Dealers
Association: $192,250 to 187
Congressmen

Opposed

.2523

Dummy variable indicating
automobile manufacturing
importancein a district

7. B-I Bomber Appropriation
House Vote 484, 1977
Sample Size: 419
FavoringGroup: 207
Opposing Group: 212

Would delete fundingfor
productionof 5 B-I bombers.

Rockwell International
Corporation: $7,800 to 35
Congressmen

Opposed

.1840

The sample foreach issue consists of all congressmenvotingon the issue, with the exception of those appointed to fillvacancies occurringsince the previous
election.

cators of power), a dummyvariable for incumbency (to indicate likelihood of election), the
candidate's vote percentage in the preceding
election (also an indicatorof likelihood of election),10and exogenous variables fromthe equation explaining votes to serve as proxies for a
candidate's initialposition.
For each issue, model SPT was estimatedby
two techniques. First,underthe assumptionthat
p = 0, single equation probit and Tobit estimators were employed. The more general
model, which allows p to take non-zero values,
was thenestimatedby the FIML method.For the
truckweightlimitsissue it was necessary to estimate the model twice, once consideringonly
American Trucking Association contributions,

and once considering only Teamster contributions. Separate analysis ofthetwo groupswas required since my programto compute FIML estimates of model SPT is limitedto two equation
systems.
Space limitations preclude the reportingof
complete resultshere,'1 so I will firstsummarize
those findingswhich are similaraccordingto the
two techniques, and thenturnto a discussion of
the estimatedeffectsof contributions,which are
reportedin table 2.
In the probitequations explainingvoting,the
results consistentlyshowed that ideology, party
and indicatorsof constituentinterests
affiliation,
are important determinantsof congressmen's
votingdecisions. Accordingto both single equation and simultaneous equation estimates, the
coefficientof ACA, the ideological rating,was
significantat the 1% level for 6 of 7 issues, and
the coefficientof PARTY, a dummyvariable in-

10 If the candidate's vote percentage is actually endogeecononous, contraryto the assumptionofthe model, further
metric difficultiesarise. In addition to the obvious simultaneityproblem,estimatesreportedhere would be subject to
a selectivitybias, since only winningcandidates (i.e., those
11 Complete results are available from the author upon
witha vote percentageabove 50%) are included in the samrequest.
ple.
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CONTRIBUTION COEFFICIENTS AND ERROR TERM CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
EXPLAIN VOTING

IN EQUATIONS TO

(asymptotict-statisticsare in parentheses)

Issue/Group
1. Red-liningDisclosure
American Banking Association
2. Milk Prices
Dairy Groups
3. Truck Weight Limits
TruckingAssociation
4. Truck Weight Limits
Teamsters
5. Crude Oil Tax Rebate
Oil Companies
6. Auto Emissions Standards
National Automobile Dealers Assoc.
7. B-i Bomber Appropriation
Rockwell International
8. Cargo PreferenceBill
MaritimeUnions

Single Equation
Probit

FIML
Probit

Error Term
CorrelationCoefficient

0.2739
(0.7912)

0.1783
(0.3148)

0.2416

0.0635
(0.5868)
0.0192
(0.0654)
0.1902
(0.5977)
-0.2906
(-0.8027)
-0.1814
(-0.9623)
7.9520
(1. 8735)C
1.578
(1.1375)

0.0669
(0.2186)
0.3231

(2.3428)b

0.4558

(2.3428)b

0.2572
(1.6168)
0.2822
(1.6994)c
0.3309
(3.1053)a
6.2879
(3.7243)a
0.3920
(5.1031)a

(2.1665)b

0.2874

(2.0264)b

0.0538
(0.2742)
0.4080
(1.8318)c
0.4965
(3.5425)a

-0.1852
(-0.4398)
0.3447

(2.1379)b

at the 1% level.
bSignificantat the 5% level.
'Significant at the 10% level.

aSignificant

dicating a Democrat, was significantat the 1% sively. In the simple two-equationmodel of this
level for5 of 7 issues. All coefficientsof variables paper, I have not taken account of the possible
included to representconstituentpreferencesin importanceof candidate solicitationefforts.(Futhe votingequations were significantat the 10% ture work mightusefullyattemptto incorporate
level or higher,and expected sign patternspre- effortof solicitationinto a model similarto this
one.) The resultsalso showed some tendencyfor
vailed.
Estimates for the Tobit equations explaining groups to give along ideological lines. Business
contributionswere also quite similarforthe two groups most oftengave to conservatives, while
estimationtechniques. Since the single equation labor groups gave to liberals. Contributionsdid
Tobit estimatesare consistent,thisis not surpris- not follow partylines very strictly,however. A
ing. The contributionequations showed that, as numberof business groups (includingthe bankanticipated,contributionswere targetedprimar- ingassociation, the truckingassociation, and auily at incumbents,especially those who were tomobile dealers) joined with labor groups to
membersof importantcommittees.For 6 of the 8 give morecontributionsto Democrats. The latter
forthe findinglends credence to the 'quid pro quo"
contributing
groupsstudied,the coefficient
dummyindicatingan incumbentwas positiveand hypothesis,since Democrats were probablyconsignificantat the 10% level or higher.With the sidered morepowerfulby virtueof theirmajority
exception of the Teamsters, each contributing party status. In addition, interestgroups gave
group gave significantly
highercontributionsto heavily to congressmeninitiallypredisposed to
membersof a relatedcommittee.The resultsalso vote in their favor. Dairy contributorsgave to
showed thatcontributorsgave less to candidates those fromfarmingdistricts,oil companies gave
who were elected by largermarginsin the elec- to those fromoil producingstates, and maritime
tion. Althoughthe theoreticaldiscussion hypoth- unions gave to those withportsin theirdistricts.
esized that contributionswould be aimed at These findingssuggestthatthe desire to maintain
likelywinners,an explanationforthis resultcan a systematicreward structure,or to communibe offered.It is plausible that many candidates cate with the public by means of candidates'
who are verylikelyto win simplydo not solicitor campaigning,may be importantinterestgroup
accept contributions.The negative sign for the motives.
Table 2 providesestimatesof y (the coefficient
coefficientof the congressman's vote percentage
may occur because vote percentageis correlated of contributionsin the equation explainingvotes)
withcandidate decisions not to campaign exten- and p (the errortermcorrelationcoefficient)for
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each issue. It is apparent that the estimatedeffects of contributionson voting differsubstantiallyforthe two estimationtechniques. According to the single equation probitestimates,conforeach of the
tributionshad positivecoefficients
eight contributors analyzed, and six of the
at the 10% level. The
coefficientswere significant
FIML estimatesof model SPT indicatemuchless
substantial effects of contributions;only one
contributioncoefficient(that of Rockwell International contributionsin the B-i bomber voting
equation) retainsa significantcoefficient.In the
votingequations for all other issues, estimated
contributioncoefficientswere smallerthan their
singleequation counterparts(two even had negative signs) and the estimatederrortermcorrelation coefficientwas positive. The positive correlation between the error terms indicates that
campaign contributionsare likelyto go to candidates who are likely to vote favorably on the
relevantissue; hence singleequation estimatesof
y are biased upwards. In fivecases, a t-testat the
10% significancelevel indicatesthatthe hypothesis of zero correlationcan be rejected, so it appears that the use of the more general simultaneous model is appropriate.
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imprecisionof these estimatesin the votingequation. If bettermodels to explain contributionsare
developed in the future, this might result in
greaterprecisionin estimatingthe effectsof contributionson voting.
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